Abstract: Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is designed to be secure against any detector-side channel attacks. However, assumption of characterized sources in preparation is a demanding requirement and can not be fully satisfied in real-life implementations. Luckily, by utilizing the data of mismatched bases, the system can even generate secure keys with uncharacterized sources. Here, we give a framework on investigating the practical performance of an improved MDI-QKD with uncharacterized sources, where the three-intensity decoy-state method is employed and full parameter optimizations are applied. Simulation results show that the improved method can significantly enhance the performance compared with the original MDI-QKD with uncharacterized sources.
Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can provide two distant users (Alice and Bob) with an unconditionally secure way to share secret keys even at the presence of an eavesdropper. Its security is based on the law of quantum mechanics [1] - [3] . The first QKD protocol was proposed in 1984 by Bennet and Brassard (BB84) [4] . However, due to the imperfections of devices in practical systems, Eve can launch hostile attacks for several different flaws [5] - [9] . To solve these problems, device-independent QKD (DI-QKD) was proposed [10] . Unfortunately, DI-QKD is hard to be realized with current technology. As a compromise, a more practical strategy so-called measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) was put forward [11] , [12] . Recently, MDI-QKD has become a preferred protocol for implementations and been extensively studied both theoretically [13] - [18] and experimentally [19] - [22] . Besides, twin-field QKD [23] and its modified protocol [24] - [27] have been proposed to overcome the fundamental rate-distance limit. Based on single-photon interference, these protocols have much more difficulties in implementations than MDI-QKD.
Unlike DI-QKD immune to all the device loopholes, MDI-QKD is designed to be secure against all the side-channel attacks directed on the detection part which are more vulnerable to eavesdropping. However, an important and demanding premise of MDI-QKD is well characterized sources. To relax this assumption, Yin et al. modified the original MDI-QKD protocol by incorporating the mismatchedbasis data into security analysis [28] , [29] , which only assumes that the source states are qubits. Later on, this method was further investigated in [30] , [31] . Recently, Hwang et al. gave an improved bound based on Yin et al.'s work by deriving a more precise estimation of the phase-error rate [32] . However, Hwang et al.'s work only considered the case of using the single-photon source, which cannot be implemented in practice.
Inspired by the work in Ref. [33] which employs the decoy-state method [34] - [37] to make the original MDI-QKD protocol more practical, we generalize the work in Ref. [32] to a more practical scenario, where practical sources with the aid of the decoy-state method can be used in MDI-QKD with uncharacterized encoding. Unlike previous decoy-state MDI-QKD works [33] , [38] - [40] , our work makes fewer request on the source. In this paper, we investigate its performance under realistic experimental conditions. Moreover, full parameter optimizations are carried out [38] . The paper is organized as follows: In Sec 2, we introduce the improved MDI-QKD with uncharacterized sources, where the three-intensity decoy-state method is applied; In Sec 3, we carry out numerical simulations and comparisons; Finally, summaries and outlooks are given in Sec 4.
Improved Three-Intensity Decoy-State MDI-QKD With Uncharacterized Sources
In original MDI-QKD protocol, Alice and Bob assume that the encoding states are well characterized. However, the encoding devices in practical systems, such as polarization modulators and phase modulators, inevitably introduce modulation errors. Here, with the three-intensity decoy-state method [37] , we generalize the improved MDI-QKD with uncharacterized qubits [32] to the more practical weak coherent sources (WCS). A schematic setup is shown in Fig. 1 .
Below let us describe the improved three-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD with uncharacterized sources step by step [32] : 1) With the practical WCSs, Alice and Bob randomly choose intensities from {u, v, o} and prepare two encoding states denoted as |ϕ m and |ϕ n respectively, where m, n ∈ {0, 1}. o is the vacuum state. They also prepare the checking states |ϕ 2 and ϕ 2 , denoted as the superposition of the first two states respectively:
where c m and c n are non-negative real numbers, θ and θ are real numbers. Then, the states are sent to the untrusted third party (UTP). 2) After the UTP performs the Bell-state measurement (BSM), the outcome 0 (failure) or 1 (success) is sent to Alice and Bob through classical channel. 3) Alice and Bob keep all the successful events including those data from mismatched bases.
Corresponding gains and quantum-bit error-rates (QBER) can be calculated. Then, the yield of single-photon pulses Y 11 and the phase error-rate of single-photon pulses e p are estimated according to the data. 4) Error correction and privacy amplification are performed before calculating the final secret keys. Before introducing the formula, we define p (x|mn) as the probability which causes a BSM result x when Alice (Bob) sends a single photon pulse in m (n) state, m, n ∈ {0, 1, 2}. For simplicity, we denote the conditional probabilities p (x|mn) as p mn since all the events utilized in our calculation are successful events.
By using an equivalent entanglement distillation protocol (EDP )method [1] , [2] , [29] , [32] , we can express the bit error-rate of the single-photon contribution in encoding states as:
Correspondingly, the single-photon phase-error rate is [32] :
where 
c 0 , c 1 , c 0 and c 1 are variables, which satisfy the following constraints:
To estimate the upper bound of single-photon phase error, the gain Q mn μμ should be simulated firstly. μ and μ are the intensities of Alice and Bob respectively. We can directly use the model proposed in Ref. [15] .
After that, all the Q mn μμ can be presented in this form: (3) with constraints Eq. (5) by using nonlinear programming method.
Besides, we use M 11 to represent the successful detection events of single-photon contribution, and can calculate by using the method as introduced in Refs. [39] , [40] .
Finally, the secret key rate can be expressed as:
where
, f is the error correction efficiency, N is the number of pulses sent by users, M
E ncE nc uu
and E
are the number of counting events and the QBER in the encoding basis which can be directly measured in the experiment. Here in this theoretical work, models in Refs. [15] , [38] , [39] can be employed to predict these observed values.
Numerical Simulations
In this section, numerical simulations of the three-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD scheme with uncharacterized sources are given. Without loss of generality, only the BSM outcome φ + = 1 √ 2 (|00 + |11 ) is considered. The simulation parameters are shown in Table 1 [16], [30] . η d and Y 0 are the detection efficiency and dark count rate per pulse at the UTP's side; e d : the misalignment error rate; e 0 : the error rate of dark counts; α: the transmission fiber loss constant; f : the error correction efficiency; ε fai lur e : the security bound. Finite data-size effect is considered by adopting the Chernoff bound. Furthermore, to get a better performance of the secret key rate and transmission distance, we take advantage of the full parameter optimization method [38] .
Considering the finite-size effect [16] , [39] - [41] , we make a comparison among our work, Hwang et al.'s work in Ref. [32] , and Zhang et al.'s work in Ref. [30] . The numbers of total pulses sent by Alice and Bob are set as N = 10 14 , 10 13 , 10 12 . Moreover, the full parameter optimization method is adopted to improve the performance of the two schemes. Corresponding results are shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 . Note that, Zhang et al.'s results involve the original decoy-state MDI-QKD scheme with uncharacterized sources [29] . Fig. 2 shows the comparison of e p when N = 10 13 . Obviously, the value of e p with the improved method is much lower than using the original method. It can be attributed to the better choice of phases in Bell states, which contributes to the more concise estimation of the difference between the phase error rate and the bit error rate. Fig. 3 shows the key rates of three different works. Hwang et al.'s work is better than the other two methods. However, it employs the idea single-photon source and seems impractical. In the two practical deocoy-state works, our present work exhibits better performance in both transmission distance and secret key rate. For example, the new method can present about 20 km longer in the transmission distance. Note that the methods considering the statistic of mismatched bases are susceptible to the finite data-size effect. However, the security of MDI-QKD system is improved. [30] . The number in the label means the order of data-size. For example, Present 14 means the line takes the method in this work and the number of total pulses sent by each user is 10 14 .
Summaries and Outlooks
In conclusion, we have presented an improved three-intensity decoy-state method with uncharacterized sources by employing WCS. Furthermore, we take realistic experimental conditions into account and carry out full parameter optimizations. Through numerical simulations, we demonstrate that our present method can exhibit significant enhanced performance in both the final key generation rate and the secure transmission distance than the former work. In all, our present work requires less assumption on experimental conditions, which, however, can still present very good performance and can be realized with current technology.
